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Abstract 
Research in the field of EU transposition studies has often been divided about the nature 
and number of independent variables that would be needed to understand actual patterns of 
“differential” transposition across Europe. In turn, extant approaches can only partially 
explain the observed transposition and implementation gap in the European Union. One of 
the most common, yet most contentious independent variables used in the discipline is the 
so-called “misfit hypothesis”. The misfit looks at how much EU requirements match the 
domestic status quo and, in turn, how this match impacts upon transposition processes and 
outcomes. Empirically, however, the argument has proven inconclusive. A vibrant debate has 
recently been launched among proponents and detractors of the argument. This paper seeks 
to contribute to this debate by proposing a comprehensive theoretical re-evaluation of the 
hypothesis, both from a conceptual and operational perspective. Only by “cutting through the 
jungle” of existing misfit definitions and operationalisations can a path be cleared for a future, 
more successful use of the hypothesis. The paper presents a novel conceptualisation of the 
hypothesis, relevant for the study of transposition processes and outcomes. The 
conceptualisation is illustrated through the Austrian transposition experience of two EU Anti-
discrimination directives. 
Zusammenfassung 
In der Forschung zur Umsetzung von EU-Richtlinien herrscht oft Uneinigkeit darüber, welche 
Faktoren zur Erklärung der divergierenden Umsetzungsergebnisse in den Mitgliedstaaten 
herangezogen werden müssen und wie das tatsächliche Ausmaß des 
Implementationsdefizits in der EU festgestellt werden kann. Einer der am häufigsten 
verwendeten, aber zugleich unklarsten und verwirrendsten Faktoren, die in diesem 
Zusammenhang ins Feld geführt werden, ist der Grad der Übereinstimmung zwischen EU-
Anforderungen und nationalem Status Quo. Gemäß der so genannten Misfit-Hypothese hat 
dieser „Goodness-of-fit“-Faktor entscheidenden Einfluss auf Erfolg oder Scheitern der 
Umsetzung von EU-Richtlinien. Diese Hypothese ist jedoch aufgrund verschiedenster 
empirischer Resultate äußerst umstritten, was zu einer lebhaften Debatte zwischen 
Befürwortern und Kritikern dieser Sichtweise geführt hat. Der vorliegende Beitrag greift diese 
Debatte auf und schlägt eine neue Konzeptionalisierung und Operationalisierung des Misfit-
Begriffs vor. Die Nützlichkeit der dabei neu entwickelten Messinstrumente für die 
verschiedenen Misfit-Ebenen wird am Beispiel der Umsetzung von zwei Anti-
Diskriminierungsrichtlinien in Österreich dargestellt. 
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Introduction 
Research on the transposition and general implementation of European legislation in the 
member states is a recent endeavour. Its emergence can be traced to the early 1990s, with 
the Single European Act and Single Market Project, which triggered an unprecedented 
legislative effort in Brussels and the member states. During this period, over 250 legislative 
proposals were pushed down the legislative pipeline. Since then, several rounds of Treaty 
reforms have ensured that the Union is able to produce more legislation in an ever-increasing 
number of policy areas. Not surprisingly, this rush in legislative activity coincided with a surge 
in academic interest on the fate of these laws after EU-level decision-making.  
This interest stretched beyond formal implementation and indeed contributed to a deeper 
understanding of the Europeanisation phenomenon. Europeanisation is generally 
understood as the “top-down” impact of European integration on the member states 
(Ladrech 1994: 69; Radaelli 2003: 30). It also refers to the analysis over time of whether and 
how changes in domestic institutions take place as a consequence of the development of 
EU-level institutions – if at all. Institutions are broadly conceived as social phenomena that 
create stable, predictable and reliable patterns of collective and individual behavior (Peters 
1999; Premfors 2001). This includes formal and informal rules, procedures, routines, norms, 
conventions, structures, policies, policy instruments, standards and problem-solving 
approaches.  
Typically, Europeanisation has a direct impact upon a member state through the use of EU 
directives – the most common form of European legislation. Directives provide a direct, 
visible and “hard” link between the European Union and its member states. Indeed, 
directives carry EU level institutions (e.g., laws, policies and/or organisations) that inevitably 
impact on the domestic institutional context during and after implementation. EU directives 
go through a three-stage procedure covering the successive phases of transposition, 
enforcement and application, which altogether constitute the implementation process. This, 
in turn, is vital to determine the strength and future path of the European impact at home. 
First, directives have to be transposed into the national law of a member state by the 
administration, the political system and societal actors (transposition). Second, new 
legislation has to be domestically enforced by the administration and the courts 
(enforcement). Third, norm addressees need to conform to the legal rules enacted as a 
reaction to a directive (application). The strength of the European impact can therefore be 
picked up by studying each of these processes, their outcomes, as well as the “softer”, long 
term analysis of how European institutions were able (or not) to shape domestic institutions. 
Scholars rightly argue whether the implementation process can be divided into three 
separate stages, yet splitting them in such a manner provides important analytical gains. In 
particular, by doing so, researchers are able to identify the specific factors and variables at 
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work during each of the stages, which may not always be the same or may work in dissimilar 
ways across phases.  
Hitherto, most implementation studies have been transposition studies. In particular, scholars 
focused upon the formal process of transposition and its consequences in terms of timing.1 
This paper contributes to this body of literature by investigating member state transposition 
processes and their broader consequences upon transposition outcomes. The outcome of 
transposition has often been unclearly conceptualised as a dependent variable in the 
literature (Hartlapp and Falkner 2007); even though a comprehensive operationalisation for 
this variable already exists (Falkner et al. 2005; Steunenberg 2007). Scholars have looked at 
both timing2 and correctness of transposition.3 Whereas the timing of transposition can be 
traced back to how the transposition process was actually conducted, correctness is a more 
complex indicator that can only be indirectly linked to the process itself, thus requiring a 
deeper analysis of domestic-level factors of transposition. These factors, however, have also 
been a matter of controversy and debate.   
A common feature in the study of transposition has been the almost ritual reference, testing 
and rejection of the so-called “misfit hypothesis”. In its original form, the misfit hypothesis 
posits that the higher the institutional match between the EU’s requirements and the 
domestic status quo, the smoother the implementation and transposition process (Duina 
1997). Yet, while a smooth transposition process translates into outcome timeliness, it can 
only yield a partial prediction on how correct the outcome of transposition will actually be. 
Not surprisingly, scholars have shown in myriad empirical studies that transposition is a more 
complex and dynamic process than what the misfit approach hypothesises (e.g., Haverland 
2000; Héritier et al. 2001; Falkner et al. 2005: 289-291; Mastenbroek 2005: 1111 or 
                                                     
1 The enforcement and application stages have not been as popular among EU researchers primarily because data 
is not always available (Pülzl and Treib 2006). The enforcement stage, in addition, involves a more legalistic 
approach.  
2 Directives may be transposed on time, denoting that the process is finalised before the official deadline but after 
the directive had been passed in Brussels (i.e., no anticipatory adaptation). In contrast to timely transposition, delays 
may be minor or major. Transposition is almost on time when the delay does not exceed six months after the official 
deadline. Transposition is significantly delayed when transposition is delayed over six months after the deadline 
(Falkner et al. 2005).  
3 Directives can be transposed completely correctly, which “denotes full compliance with all adaptation requirements 
in the transposition stage and notification of the relevant laws to the European Commission” (Falkner et al. 2005: 
268-9.). They may also be transposed essentially correctly, when the state reached “an essentially successful 
fulfillment of most requirements (…) and, simultaneously, of the most central requirements of a directive” (Ibid.). 
Finally, transposition is incorrect when a law has a different spirit and underlying goals than those pursued by 
Brussels. Incorrect transposition may happen because of under-implementation, omissions or modifications to the 
letter and/or effects of a directive. Member states may also transpose non-binding recommendations or provisions, 
or transpose other provisions not included in the body of a directive, what is known as over-implementation or “gold-
plating”. Over- and under-implementation may coexist in the transposition of a directive when domestic actors go 
beyond the letter of a directive for some provisions but fall short for others. They constitute examples of non-lineal 
transposition (Steunenberg 2007).  
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Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006; Steunenberg 2007: 26). Yet, despite overwhelming 
empirical dismissal, the argument still constitutes a “master variable” (Falkner 2007: 1012) in 
many transposition and implementation studies (Thomson 2007; Toshkov 2007). A debate 
has recently been launched on whether the hypothesis should actually be left out of future 
research projects or not (Duina 2007; Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006, 2007). The present 
paper feeds into this particular debate. 
Looking at the state-of-the-art, there are as many definitions and operationalisations of the 
hypothesis as works that used the level of misfit as an explanatory variable. This theoretical 
and empirical diversity requires major re-consideration, especially because the discipline 
displays contradictory dead-ends and inconclusive results on this particular issue. Taking 
stock of existing works and cumulating various successful theoretical and empirical 
approaches may improve the use of the hypothesis. In particular, the present paper 
combines the typical focus on material-organisational costs in the study of misfit levels with 
the more recent analysis of normative elements. By doing so, this paper also cumulates 
various promising theoretical improvements in the field that look at both timing and 
correctness of transposition and aim at providing a clearer delimitation of the argument. The 
main thrust of the paper will be to show how the combination of both approaches can shed 
light upon transposition processes and outcomes, beyond the expectations of each individual 
dimension of the goodness-of-fit, particularly those derived from the common study of 
material-organisational costs. The re-conceptualised hypothesis will shed light upon the 
Austrian transposition experience of EU disability and race/ethnicity anti-discrimination 
provisions.  
This paper is divided into three sections. First, the paper defines the concept of misfit and 
looks at the use of this popular independent variable in the transposition, implementation and 
Europeanisation state-of-the-art literature. A cursory summary of the main empirical works 
that tested the hypothesis and their conclusions is also presented here. Second, the paper 
refines the argument, and consequently proposes a novel re-operationalisation of the 
hypothesis. Third, the new misfit conception is discussed in the light of the Austrian 
transposition experience with two EU Anti-discrimination directives. Finally, the paper sums 
up the main potential advantages and limitations of using this approach in the future. 
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The Misfit Hypothesis: Definition and Operationalisation 
Definition 
In its original form, the misfit hypothesis posits that the better the institutional match between 
EU requirements and pre-existing domestic structures, the smoother the implementation 
process and the better the domestic outcome. Based on a broad understanding of what 
institutions are, Duina and Blithe (1999: 498) offered one of the first (and clearest) 
formulations of the argument:  
“Implementation of common market rules depends primarily on the fit between rules and the 
policy legacy and the organization of interest groups in member states. Rules that challenge 
national policy legacies and the organization of interest groups are not implemented fully 
and on time; they are normally rejected, typically reaching domestic systems only partially 
and long after the official deadlines (…). When, on the other hand, rules propose principles 
consistent with those found in national institutions, implementation is a smooth affair and the 
common market reaches smoothly and deeply into the nation-state.” 
Intuitively, the misfit hypothesis is persuasive because it assumes that departures from 
domestic institutional arrangements shape negatively domestic actor behaviour. This, in turn, 
is expected to impact upon timing of transposition. Having an institutional setting similar to 
the one imposed by a directive may facilitate the task of reaching domestic agreement 
because domestic actors see no difficulties in transposing European law. As a result, 
transposition is expected to be swift, and the final outcome correct. Conversely, a domestic 
institutional setting that radically departs from EU demands complicates the task of 
transposition, leading to delays in process and an incorrect outcome.  
Theoretically, most misfit-centred studies have taken a neo-institutionalist approach to 
examining how the domestic arena reacts, if at all, to EU policy-making (Duina 1997, 1999; 
Duina and Blithe 1999; Knill and Lenschow 1998; Cowles et al. 2001; Knill 2001; Börzel 
1999, 2003, 2005; Börzel and Risse 2000, 2003; Radaelli 2000, 2003).4 Neo-institutionalism 
provides a set of tools “to elucidate the role that institutions play in the determination of 
social and political outcomes” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 936). This is particularly useful in the 
study of transposition, which could also be understood as the political process whereby 
domestic political actors modify and create new domestic institutions as a result of EU 
impulses, usually in the form of a directive.  
                                                     
4 New institutionalism has three variants, namely historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and 
sociological institutionalism. A full definitional effort of the three variants cannot be provided here (but see Hall and 
Taylor 1996: 941-2; Pierson 1996 for historical institutionalism; Risse 2004 or Checkel 1999 for an overview of 
current sociological approaches).  
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According to historical institutionalism, an institution develops, over time, robustness towards 
changes in its functional and normative environment. This explains why most misfit-centred 
research projects assumed that actor reluctance to changing the domestic status quo stems 
from an institutionally “thick” and “sticky” environment. First, the environment where 
transposition takes place is “thick” because there are myriad institutions involved in 
transposition, each contributing to processes and their outcomes in different ways. Second, 
the environment is “sticky” because, over time, institutions develop robustness. This renders 
change slow and difficult. Given such an environment, only those directives fitting with the 
domestic status quo are expected to be smoothly transposed and on time. The hypothesis 
thus focused upon the costs of institutional transformation as a major driver of (or obstacle 
to) the transposition of EU directives. These costs have usually been determined by how 
much a particular EU law or policy departs from the domestic policy legacy and its 
organisational arrangements – the material-organisational dimension. In other words, costs 
reflected how incoming EU legislation fits with the existing status quo (Duina and Blithe 
1999). As noted earlier, most studies expected domestic actor reluctance to change 
whenever the misfit level was large. This assumed rational and cost-aware actors.   
Even though a common definition settled around these lines, scholars have not always been 
talking about the same issues. This is first and foremost evidenced by the various ad hoc 
operationalisations extracted from this definition. Cumulative work has not characterised the 
field and, in contrast to the classical definition of Duina and Blithe (1999), Knill and 
Lenschow referred to a broadly defined “institutional misfit” (1999: 26, 2000, 2001; Knill 
2001); and, relatedly, Knill (1998) differentiated between change “within” and change “of” 
core national administrative institutions. In another study, Börzel and Risse distinguished 
between “policy misfit” and “institutional misfit” (2003: 606; Börzel 2000, 2003, 2005). For 
them, the concept of institutional misfit was used to compare European policies and national 
administrative structures and traditions, including established interaction patterns between 
state actors and interest groups. The concept of policy misfit referred to the match between 
EU measures and domestic political instruments, standards and problem-solving 
approaches. Moreover, while some authors merged both dimensions (e.g. Héritier et al. 
2001; Duina 1997, 1999; Risse et al. 2001), others differentiated among several types of 
misfit. For instance, Hansen and Scholl distinguished between “constitutional misfit”, “cultural 
misfit” and “functional misfit” (2002: 1). Caporaso noted that “the fit/misfit can be over 
policies, economic conditions (gender inequality), ideational systems (conceptions of 
citizenship), institutions and even constitutional orders (basic rights granted under national 
constitutions and rights granted or denied at the European level)” (2006: 13). In addition, 
other scholars looked at domestic institutions and cultural changes over time, merging in the 
concept of misfit the number and nature of veto players in a system, the capacity for 
systemic political leadership, the degree of support for European integration and a 
conceptualisation of national identities (Dyson and Goetz 2003: 17). In a similar vein, some 
works also built upon social constructivism and sociological institutionalism, as pointed out 
by the concepts of “normative misfit”, “normative incompatibility”, “cognitive misfit” or 
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“normative resonance” (see Checkel 2001 or Risse 2001 on the fit of Europe and domestic 
ideas and identities; but also Börzel and Risse 2003; Cowles et al. 2001; Knill and Lehmkuhl 
2002 or Dimitrova and Rhinard 2005). Finally, Börzel and Risse also looked at “mediating 
variables” (2000, 2003; Börzel 2003, 2005; Cowles et al. 2001) such as the domestic 
empowerment of reform-minded actors, which enabled them to explain special outlier cases 
whenever the misfit hypothesis failed. This approach, however, perpetuated the use of the 
hypothesis as a “necessary” condition (Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006).  
Empirical Testing  
Not surprisingly, researchers using the misfit hypothesis obtained inconclusive results, 
spreading theoretical and empirical confusion. There is neither agreement from a theoretical 
point of view on what the goodness-of-fit exactly refers to, nor a common understanding on 
how to approach the empirical world from this perspective. Cumulative work based on a 
comprehensive, unique operationalisation, be it for quantitative or qualitative analyses, is still 
lacking. Given the urgency for truly cumulative work in political science (see the June 2007 
issue of European Political Science on “Symposium: why political science is not scientific 
enough”), the present use of the misfit hypothesis seems deceiving. Recapitulating, most 
authors privileged material-organisational costs, which are easier to measure. Ideational 
elements, such as norms, meanwhile, have generally been treated as a general, contextual 
factor or simply en passant (but see Dimitrova and Rhinard 2005).  
The use of several operationalisations for the concept led to different empirical results, which 
seem detrimental to the hypothesis. Empirically, most studies show that reality is more 
complex and dynamic than what the misfit hypothesis originally predicts, even though all 
works operationalised the argument differently. Accordingly, it is often said that the 
hypothesis failed whenever actors wanted to change the domestic status quo despite having 
high misfit levels, thus concluding that domestic actor reluctance cannot be related to the 
misfit level (Haverland 2000; Héritier et al. 2001; Falkner et al. 2005: 289-291; Mastenbroek 
2005: 1111 or Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006; Steunenberg 2007: 26). A recent large-scale 
test for the hypothesis was performed by Falkner et al. (2005: 289-291). In their study, the 
logic underlying the misfit hypothesis only showed up in a few instances of their “worlds of 
compliance”, mostly associated with “challenges to deeply entrenched, institutional or policy 
traditions” in the “world of domestic politics”, where domestic political mechanisms are 
crucial (Falkner 2007: 1012). Surprisingly, they also found that the “goodness-of-fit” might 
have an inverse effect in the other country clusters. In the “world of transposition neglect”, 
high misfit levels may facilitate transposition, while in the “world of law observance”, misfit 
levels do not impact upon transposition (Ibid.). 
Given these empirical findings, scholars have repeatedly criticized the very foundations of 
the misfit hypothesis (e.g., Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Knill and Lenschow 2000: 256; Falkner 
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et al. 2005; Goetz 2005: 276). Criticisms concerned the presumed link between the 
goodness-of-fit, the ease of adaptation and final outcomes in terms of both timing and 
correctness. As Mastenbroek and Kaeding (2006: 332) argued, the hypothesis is “logically 
flawed” because the link between these variables is “spurious” (see also Steunenberg 2007). 
Moreover, these studies suggest that even small levels of misfit can lead to long and 
complicated transposition processes and, vice-versa, swift transposition processes can 
happen despite high misfit levels. Hence, high misfit levels do not always seem to equal 
compliance problems, as suggested by, e.g., Börzel (2005: 50). Consequently, some 
scholars argue that the misfit hypothesis is, at best, a “very rarely true theory” (Falkner et al. 
2007a) and that misfit-centred approaches should be abandoned altogether (Mastenbroek 
and Kaeding 2006), in favour of actor-centred and preference-based arguments.  
It is true that the misfit argument may have been too static and deterministic in the past, 
especially if assumed to hold for every instance of transposition or implementation, without 
taking stock of past research and empirical findings. In its traditional form, it assumes that 
policy-makers always want to maintain the status quo and resist changes that depart from 
domestic arrangements without consideration of their ideological preferences. So, the 
theoretical and empirical criticisms may be well-founded given current definitions and their 
accompanying operationalisations. Yet, conceptual over-stretching and lack of empirical 
certainty cannot imply that the underlying logic is automatically flawed. Indeed, the 
hypothesis’ field of action may simply not have been properly delineated. Looking at the 
existing body of literature, the hypothesis seems to work in some cases. It is often the case 
that actors defend the integrity, stability and cohesiveness of domestic institutional 
environments against mismatching EU reforms. However, this still happens via the 
preferences of domestic actors, as suggested by the classical hypothesis, and may be more 
important in some member states and policy areas than in others, due to differential 
institutional structures. Thus, a re-consideration of the argument is necessary in the light of 
these circumstances. This is even more important given that the misfit approach represents 
a “building block in the consolidation of Europeanisation studies as an academic field of 
inquiry” (Toshkov 2005: 5) and because “virtually all decisions that have to be downloaded 
from the EU level imply some kind and degree of misfit” (Ibid. p. 11). 
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A Theoretical Re-consideration of the Misfit Hypothesis  
Re-Definition 
As the previous discussion showed, scholars in the fields of transposition, implementation 
and Europeanisation argue that the misfit hypothesis does not stand up to the empirical 
reality and that it is too static. Yet, there are two major problems with the current 
conceptualisation of the misfit hypothesis. First, empirical research in the field is 
inconclusive, which is related to the operationalisations used by scholars. In other words, the 
type of misfit being measured has important implications for the results obtained. Is it 
institutional, policy, both or even another type of misfit? To what extent and under which 
conditions are domestic actors influenced by misfit levels, if at all? Observed discrepancies 
should not be used to categorically rule out the argument. Rather, they should point at where 
researchers left a blank space that still has to be filled. As Duina remarked, the link between 
transposition and the degree of fit may indeed exist but not be active all of the time (2007: 
340), so the task of researchers is to find the conditions activating this linkage. This will 
provide a reasonable scope for the hypothesis. 
Previous research did not always test the hypothesis for situations where its underlying 
argumentation holds. Scholars rarely acknowledged explicitly that domestic actors provide 
the actual linkage between EU requirements and domestic arrangements. They are the “key 
translators” (Laffan 2005) and may be reluctant to change the domestic status quo whenever 
institutional change involves insurmountable costs that they are unwilling to assume, are 
incapable to undertake, or even are unable to understand. And so, research focused upon 
how the level of misfit generates technical difficulties and incapability in transposition (Type 
I). Other studies tried to uncover misfit-generated opposition or unwillingness to domestic 
change (Type II). Still other scholars looked at deeper normative changes and the related 
inability to change the domestic status quo because the nature of the change is not well 
understood or perceived (Type III). While Types I and II may point at determinants going 
beyond the misfit (e.g., management and administrative factors or political ideology), Type III 
situations do actually relate the analysis to what the misfit hypothesis originally predicted. 
Clearly, using the argument indiscriminately perpetuates the infamous chronicle of the 
“goodness-of-fit” death.  
Second, and if the classical claim made by Lowi that “policy determines politics” (1972: 299) 
holds, it may also be the case that domestic actors are more likely to behave according to 
the logics of the misfit hypothesis for some policy areas, but not for others depending on the 
domestic institutional context, its thickness and stickiness. The study of individual policies 
and their change, however, cannot be considered effectively without relation to their 
historical and locational structures and actor constellations (see the concept of “policy 
contingency” by Windhoff-Héritier 1983: 359). This is a crucial point because previous 
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research has mainly focused on the material-organisational costs related to changing 
domestic institutions, without consideration to the broader institutional structure and the 
particular normative situation in which actors have to solve or define a problem. Few studies 
showed the possibility of having such “qualitative costs” (e.g., Héritier et al. 2001 and their 
“belief system”; or Börzel and Risse 2003 and their “political and organizational culture”).  
This material-organisational bias might have more to do with the development of the EU 
polity and its legislative competences than with deliberate myopia from the part of the 
research community. The EU is frequently characterised as a “regulatory state” or “regulatory 
order” (e.g., Majone 1996, 2000; Nugent 2003), where a clear and unambiguous normative 
dimension was secondary and technical expertise and issues of economic governance have 
often been at premium. Accordingly, EU directives were habitually conceived as mere sets of 
technical rules, with a limited or even absent normative content. Yet, while this may be true 
for the bulk of policy areas such as transport or environment, the EU has also been active in 
developing “progressive” regulation, often without having a strong legal basis in the Treaties. 
This is the case of recent legislation in social policy and labour law, biotechnological policy, 
the fight against climate change, or consumer protection. Interestingly enough, and relatedly, 
recent “progressive” social policy and labour law directives required longer transposition 
times than past legislation in areas such as health and safety at work (Haverland and 
Romeijn 2007: 761-3). These novel EU directives have sometimes been recognized as 
containing a non-ambiguous normative dimension, despite demanding ambitious normative 
changes in the domestic arenas of the member states. What is more, even directives with an 
apparently unimportant normative facet may actually trigger substantial normative debates 
domestically (Dimitrova and Rhinard 2005: 4).  
Re-Operationalisation: The Material-Organisational Dimension 
This paper acknowledges the cumulative character of the most sophisticated measure of the 
(classical) misfit hypothesis to date, put forward by Falkner and her research collaborators 
(2005). Therefore, this is the point of departure for a comprehensive re-operationalisation of 
the hypothesis. They considered that the measure of total misfit included the degree of policy 
misfit; the degree of politics and polity misfit; and the level of expected costs. These various 
misfit levels could be high, medium or low. The total level of misfit was computed after 
consideration of the highest level obtained in any one of these (material-organisational) 
dimensions, as no single dimension of misfit could eradicate or soften the adaptational 
pressure created in another dimension (Ibid. p. 32).  
First, policy misfit comprises the level of legal misfit and the practical significance, obtained 
by looking at the scope of application and coverage of any newly attributed right. A high level 
of legal misfit happens when completely new legal rules are created from scratch, with far-
reaching gradual changes and/or with important qualitative innovations, and no limitation on 
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the level of practical significance. This implies high levels of policy misfit. Similarly, when all 
or a significant number of workers are affected by a directive, the level of policy misfit is also 
high. When a directive has no practical significance and/or the levels of legal misfit are low, 
only a low degree of policy misfit is obtained. Second, mismatches can also appear in the 
politics and/or polity areas. Most frequently, this happens when new bodies have to be set up 
or when a crucial domestic body, organisation or procedure is challenged. For example, this 
occurs when patterns of public-private interaction are affected. The level of politics/polity 
misfit will therefore depend on the intensity of this challenge. Finally, the total level of misfit 
also depends on the economic costs of a required reform. Since the exact costs are almost 
always virtually impossible to calculate, only expected costs are taken into account. Costs 
are often used in domestic pros and cons debates, particularly among those groups of 
workers and sectors negatively concerned by a directive and can be traced accurately. For 
example, when Small and Medium-sized Enterprises or special interests (Churches) are 
opposed to a given directive, their representatives echo this opposition through relevant 
media channels. Ministerial units will do the same if a directive imposes important 
administrative burdens.  
The operationalisation developed by Falkner et al. (2005, 2007a and 2007b) stressed the 
quantitative side of misfit, focusing on how EU rules strengthen (or weaken) existing policies, 
foster the creation of new national institutions and structures, as well as mandate the 
replacement of existing ones. It is therefore insufficient to capture qualitative clashes at the 
ideational level, even though Falkner et al. (2005) studied six social policy and labour law 
directives, where norms could prima facie be at stake. Although reference is made to clashes 
of “regulatory philosophies or deeply entrenched national models” to work in favour of misfit 
in the “world of domestic politics”, these concepts are not further specified or tied to the 
particularities of their policy area.  
Re-Operationalisation: The Normative Dimension 
The existing literature has seldom provided an explicit operationalisation for the qualitative 
dimension of misfit. When both quantitative and qualitative dimensions were under the same 
roof, the qualitative side lacked explicit operationalisation. However, this may impact on the 
final misfit level because norms have a deeper impact than material or organisational 
considerations. In the study of norm compatibility, the focus lies on “how European norms 
relate and interact with different domestic norms” (Dimitrova and Rhinard 2005: 2), and how 
this process affects transposition outcomes since domestically transposed legislation has to 
become a blend of domestic and European choices (Bugdahn 2005: 177). Clashes are 
probable because perfect norm concordance is unlikely, given the “patchwork” nature of the 
European policy-making process (Héritier 1996: 1350-1351). The creation of European 
norms reflects a compromise between European states and their normative structures may 
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be foreign for a number of them. Whether this is the case is determined by member state 
variables (Gurowitz 2006: 305).  
Previous works analysed directives that were costly to transpose from a material-
organisational point of view but were unable to shed light on deeper departures from the 
institutional status quo, defined to include ideational elements. When norms approach the 
domestic arena, they have to fit into the “nested hierarchy” of norms already existing within a 
society (Campbell 1998: 399). Domestic institutions therefore reflect the societal normative 
super-structure upon which they are constructed and their change is expected to affect the 
actors called to interpret incoming norms. Indeed, domestic actors are “norm takers” 
(Acharya 2004: 269) and the possible levels of normative incompatibility are crucial in 
understanding their behaviour and, in turn, final transposition process and outcomes.  
Normative incompatibilities have similar consequences as material-organisational clashes, 
depending on their strength. Different EU norms require incorporating different forms of 
monitoring or enforcement strategies to guarantee successful application, and may underpin 
different philosophical understandings, which again may be different from member state to 
member state (Hartlapp and Falkner 2007). Hence, as March and Olsen remark (2004: 9), 
domestic actors may “find the rules and situations they encounter to be obscure. What is true 
and right and therefore what should be done may be ambiguous. Sometimes they may know 
what to do but not be able to do it because prescriptive rules and capabilities are 
incompatible”. In such situations, actors “apply criteria of similarity in order to use the most 
appropriate rule or account” (Ibid.). They engage in a search around them for potentially 
relevant rules, looking at the broader norm set that governs their polity and, at the same 
time, re-evaluating its appropriateness (Hage 2000). Thus, the misfit logic is not exogenous 
or active only through domestic actor coalitions and their interests (willingness) or powers 
(capabilities), but indeed is inherent to how domestic actors perceive and interpret their 
reality (abilities). This is important because purely material-organisational measures assume 
domestic actors are able to change the status quo. In other words, it may not always be that 
these players are unwilling or incapable to do so in a timely and/or correct manner.  
The most sophisticated operationalisation of the impact of norms was developed by 
Dimitrova and Rhinard (2005). Their norm-based approach looks at the properties of norms 
themselves, their character, degree and extent of legalization (Legro 1997).5 Building upon 
Peter Hall’s types of “ideational change” in the policy arena (1993: 279), they find three 
normative levels. They apply this three-layer hierarchy to the transposition of EU directives 
and derive hypotheses on how processes and outcomes are affected by collisions between 
the domestic norm set and European norms. Clashes may occur with domestic first-, 
                                                     
5 For a similar operationalisation of norms see Raustiala and Slaughter (2002: 546). 
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second- or third-order norms. First-order norms operate at the sector level and raise 
technical questions among policy-specific communities and experts (e.g., sector agencies, 
Non-Governmental Organisations or interest groups). The role of parliaments and political 
parties is minor here because the law to be implemented has specific characteristics that 
concern only a limited number of specialised actors. Hence, these norms are to be found in 
the policy-specific discourses and the documents of these actors, but rarely outside an 
affected community. First-order norms have limited policy effects, which are easy to predict 
and do not span policy boundaries or compromise complex policy interdependencies. This is 
the case, for example, of workplace safety norms that only concern a limited group of 
experts dealing with specific safety concerns. 
Second-order norms operate across various social sectors. They raise more political 
questions and their impact is more diffuse. Given this, the predictability of their effects is 
more difficult to determine. For example, this happens with the introduction of a new 
regulatory style or environmental protection norm. These norms span policy sector 
boundaries and require the consideration of more complex policy interdependencies. As a 
result, they may involve various constellations of ministries and experts, as well as interest 
groups, elected officials and agency representatives. These norms affect the policy 
discourse of multiple communities and actors at once and therefore the study of their 
arguments evidences if conflict existed. EU directives usually contain such second-order 
norms, related to the regulation of styles and objectives of a policy area (Majone 1996; 
Richardson 2001).  
Finally, third-order norms affect society as a whole, questioning deeply-held values, which 
legitimise the action of all players in a polity. These norms abound and are to be found in the 
constitutional order of a society. Constitutions specify how all other legal rules are to be 
produced, applied and interpreted in a polity, as well as the major commitments of a society. 
They declare a number of rights, even if most of them are primarily aspirational (Gallagher et 
al. 2005: 58). Examples of these norms are civil liberties, human rights, anti-discrimination or 
equal treatment. These norms have considerable policy effects, operating across policy 
boundaries and their interdependencies. The effects of such norms are, not surprisingly, 
most difficult to estimate and conflict at this level leads to markedly political, if not 
philosophical, society-wide debates, also reflected in the popular press and news reports. 
Thus, agencies and organisations are not as affected as parliaments and political parties 
here.  
There are two upshots with the approach presented by Dimitrova and Rhinard. First, in 
practice, norms are not always so clear-cut because definitions and sanctions of a given 
behavioural pattern are bound to a particular cultural context (Liebert 2002: 12). While third-
order norms can be easily found in constitutional texts, the empirical distinction between 
second- and first-order norms may not always be as straightforward. These associated 
“boundary problems” require empirical caution whenever labels are applied and norms are 
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sought after. Legro’s (1997) criteria of character, degree and extent of legalisation of a norm 
are helpful in this respect, as well as the arena and community concerned by it. Second, a 
purely normative approach understates the material-organisational dimension, which 
characterises the domestic impact of virtually all EU directives. Therefore, this paper argues 
that the combination of both quantitative and qualitative dimensions is bound to upgrade the 
explanatory power of the classical misfit hypothesis and provide new insights on how 
transposition processes are conducted and outcomes reached.  
Re-Operationalisation: The “Pressure Context” 
A comprehensive and truly cumulative re-operationalisation of the misfit approach requires 
the combination of both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. On the one hand, directives 
create quantitative pressure to adapt to EU law. This dimension encompasses the level of 
policy misfit (legal misfit and practical significance), the level of polity/politics misfit and the 
amount of expected costs, as in Falkner et al. (2005). The total level of misfit can either be 
high, medium or low. It links the analysis to how willing or capable a domestic actor is to 
change the status quo. On the other hand, directives generate qualitative pressure as 
incoming norms interact with domestic norm sets and clash at first-, second- or third-order 
levels, which therefore sheds light on the extent to which domestic actors are able to change 
the domestic status quo. Such a conceptualisation of the misfit approach evidences that 
previous approaches focusing on either the quantitative side or, more rarely, the qualitative 
angle, could only provide partial explanations of transposition processes and outcomes. This 
is precisely the added value of looking at both dimensions simultaneously. The combination 
could be understood as the total “pressure context”. The double dimensionality of the 
“pressure context” is summarised in Table 1.  
The Pressure Context Generated by EU Directives 
 
Quantitative Context 
 
Low level of misfit  
Medium level of misfit  
High level of misfit  
 
Qualitative Context 
 
First-order normative incompatibility 
Second-order normative incompatibility 
Third-order normative incompatibility 
Source: Dimitrova and Rhinard 2005; Falkner et al. 2005. 
 
There are three important remarks to make at this stage. First, the two dimensions are 
related. Domestic debates on the appropriateness of a norm, at any given order, reflect a 
domestic empty space, a partial absence, or an addition to the domestic normative set. 
Intuitively, this also reflects a total or partial absence of domestic rules, instruments and 
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competences for a given policy area. Yet, the higher the normative incompatibility order, the 
more densely populated the domestic rule space for domestic actors, and the higher the 
expected material-organisational costs of shifting the focus of domestic policy legacies and 
structures. Thus, norms may more often than not be at the base of domestic resistance to 
change and non-compliant outcomes than a purely material-organisational analysis would 
assume and be able to observe. As the final policy outcome is perceived and analysed 
through the lens of domestic norm sets, strategic domestic actors may try to use the 
material-organisational cost and benefit analysis to influence the transposition process. Such 
“issue relabeling” is common whenever a policy has to be reformed and may be motivated 
by domestic actor inability to transpose (see Windhoff-Héritier 1987: 56-57). Beyond 
domestic actor abilities, an “issue relabeling” strategy may also be pursued to cover 
domestic actor unwillingness or incapability to transpose a particular directive or provision of 
a directive. 
Second, and relatedly, directives typically display multi-faceted pressure contexts, where 
various material-organisational and normative combinations occur simultaneously for 
different provisions covered by a directive. As a result, domestic actors may only base their 
action upon some of the issues contained in a directive, which may determine the adaptation 
process and its outcome. In doing so, they may also divert attention away from issues they 
do not consider a political priority. This visualises EU directives dynamically as complex 
pieces of legislation, where legislators are able to deal with some provisions better than with 
others. Compliance with a directive, nonetheless, means that all provisions have to be 
transposed – even the most disliked ones (Falkner 2007: 1016). Thus, the pressure context 
is able to capture the manifold complexities faced by domestic actors during transposition. It 
informs about why delays took place and where incorrectness was actually observed.  
Third, the operationalisation of the pressure context follows the same logic as that used in 
the previous misfit discussion concerning the material-organisational dimension (see Falkner 
et al. 2005: 32). The pressure context is classified as being high when a third-order 
normative clash and/or a high level of misfit are recorded domestically. A medium level of 
pressure is achieved in the presence of second-order normative mismatches and/or medium 
misfit levels. Finally, whenever first-order norms are compromised and/or a low level of misfit 
happens, the level of total pressure context is low. On the one hand, if a high pressure level 
is attained because of third-order normative incompatibilities, it will not be softened by 
material-organisational considerations, and will therefore impregnate the transposition 
process and outcome. In that event, domestic actors will be unable to transpose on time and 
in a correct manner. Higher material-organisational costs are only likely to further confuse 
domestic actors, delay the process and worsen outcome correctness. The lower the level of 
normative incompatibility, on the other hand, the more likely will be that domestic actor 
willingness and capability drive transposition. In other words, for such cases, even if 
material-organisational costs are high, it may not necessarily be that the transposition 
outcome is delayed and incorrect. The ultimate process and outcome will be determined by 
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the variables explaining actor willingness and/or capabilities (e.g., political ideologies or 
management factors respectively). In such cases, moreover, domestic actors are more likely 
to engage in “issue relabeling”.  
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Illustration: Austria’s Transposition of Two EU Anti-Discrimi-
nation Directives 
Case Selection Rationale 
The comprehensive re-operationalisation of the misfit hypothesis presented here still needs 
to be empirically tested. An illustration is provided here for the study of two Anti-
discrimination directives (ADDs) passed by the European Union in the year 2000, namely the 
Employment Framework Directive (EFD)6 and the Race Directive (RD).7 Although an 
employment law conception of anti-discrimination law treats anti-discrimination as a small 
piece of the wider social problem of inequality (Bamforth 2004: 700), the directives are 
unique additions to the EU's legislative landscape. The ADDs regulate several grounds of 
anti-discrimination at once, expanding the levels of protection to numerous, potentially 
vulnerable communities in employment, occupation, vocational training, membership of 
employer and employee organisations, social protection, including social security and health 
care, education. In addition, for the RD, rights are extended to the access to goods and 
services available to the public, including housing. While the EFD covers the grounds of age, 
belief, disability, religion and sexual orientation, the RD covers the grounds of ethnicity and 
race.8 The RD had to be transposed by July 2003 and the EFD by December 2003, except 
for the grounds of age and disability, which could be transposed until December 2006 upon 
member state request. 
The ADDs go beyond traditional conceptions of supranational social policy and labour law. 
Indeed, the European Commission placed ideational and social citizenship logics ahead of 
the economic logic of correcting market externalities for an area that is not directly linked to 
the creation of a single market (Bell 2002). Anti-discrimination legislation may have 
advantages compared to other forms of regulation to tackle societal inequalities since its 
costs are assumed to be little compared to other more common redistributive measures used 
in the field. Yet, not all grounds covered by the ADDs imply the same material-organisational 
costs. Importantly, the ADDs contain several clearly identifiable norms. In the “old” member 
states, non-discrimination and equal treatment are norms with a prominent moral dimension, 
typically enshrined in constitutions both explicitly and implicitly (e.g., by ratifying or 
mentioning the European Convention on Human Rights). EU anti-discrimination policy has a 
long tradition dating back to the gender directives of the 1970s and subsequent revisions of 
these laws since then. The ADDs take stock of this acquis communautaire and so many 
                                                     
6 Directive 2000/43/EC, OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, 16. 
7 Directive 2000/48/EC, OJ L 180, 19.07.2000, 22. 
8 A deeper and more sophisticated analysis of the ADDs can be found elsewhere (Waddington and Bell 2001). 
 
I H S — Juan Casado Asensio / Cutting through the “misfit” jungle — 17 
third- and second-order anti-discrimination and equal treatment norms are familiar to 
domestic policy-makers.9 Their transposition, therefore, ensures that both material-
organisational and normative dimensions are picked up during the empirical analysis, even 
across covered grounds. This is possible because, as Dimitrova and Rhinard note (2005: 
12), “the grounds for possible discrimination are specified in such a way that they can be 
treated as separate norms (…) there could be a norm prohibiting discrimination on racial 
grounds and ethnicity (…), on the basis of (a) religion or belief, (b) disability, (c) age and (d) 
sexual orientation. Their identification as separate norms is critical because it is possible that 
one norm might conflict with domestic norms at some level, while others would not”. The 
same can be said about each ground’s material-organisational consequences. This is why 
the present paper only studies two relatively different grounds of discrimination included in 
the ADDs, namely disability and race/ethnicity. These grounds provide versatility for the key 
variables of the pressure context argument presented here. Legislation and policy against 
disability discrimination is more common and less polemic than that for the ground of 
ethnicity and ethnic origin. In addition, both grounds have received scant scholarly attention 
beyond legal analysis.  
The transposition of these provisions is studied for the federal-level in Austria, a case that 
presents optimal levels of variance for the independent variables explained earlier. As will be 
discussed immediately below, Austria displayed high material-organisational costs from 
transposing the provisions on the ground of disability, while at the same time having a low 
normative clash on this ground. In terms of race and ethnic origin, Austria was faced with 
more moderate material-organisational costs but deeper normative clashes. Yet, despite 
these differences, Austria was on time and over-implemented the ground of disability, but 
was delayed and incorrect for the ground of race and ethnicity. The following sections briefly 
trace the Austrian policy tradition for these two areas, as well as the total pressure context 
generated for domestic policy makers. The formal transposition process is described and the 
final outcome is evaluated in the light of the present argument.   
Austrian Policy Legacy  
Discrimination on disability grounds was the most developed ground prior to the arrival of the 
ADDs in Austria. Protection dates back to the 1969 Disabled Persons Employment Act, 
which introduced quotas and a fund to support and train disabled workers. This was 
complemented with further welfare programs in the 1980s (Obinger 2002: 32), as for 
example the creation of integration companies. Disability was explicitly mentioned on social 
                                                     
9 Contrary to Dimitrova and Rhinard (2005), this paper considers that the ADDs contain not only third-order norms in 
terms of frame, but also second- and first-order norms in terms of substance. They found the ADDs to carry third-
order norms in their study of a “new” member state (Slovakia), where the concept of anti-discrimination was 
domestically incorporated for the first time when acceding the EU. 
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security legislation, the law on compensation for special sacrifices or efforts, or the regulation 
of worker dismissals. There was even case law defining the “reasonable accommodation” of 
disabled people in the workplace, even though jurisprudence had not generated a specific 
policy to regulate work environments systematically.  
In 1997, the Federal government inserted a new clause in the constitutional catalogue of 
Human Rights prohibiting discrimination of people with disabilities (Article 7(1), sentences 3 
and 4). The clause even provided for the establishment of a sanctions system if 
discrimination were to occur. However, legal experts considered insufficient these “utterly 
vague” changes because private behaviour was not regulated and sanctions were rarely 
applied (Davy 2004: 1). In 2000 social welfare and employment promotion schemes for 
disabled people were cut down, but special employment and training programmes were 
introduced. Finally, in the context of the 2002 Austrian Action Plan for Employment, a 
programme to overcome prejudice towards the disabled was also developed; and in the 
context of the 2003 Vocational Training Act, disabled apprentices were also given the 
opportunity to enter apprenticeship-based occupations. All in all, even though policy and 
discourse for the disabled had gradually developed in Austria, a total ban on discrimination 
was “not effectively prohibited” until the ADDs (Ibid. p. 2).  
With regards to the ground of race and ethnicity, Austria had transposed the 1972 
International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, introducing 
penal provisions in criminal and administrative law against the incitement to racial hatred, 
racist insult and discrimination in the supply of goods and services. A broader anti-
discrimination framework in employment was, nonetheless, absent. Nationality was difficult 
to acquire, yet it is a condition for public sector employment. In the private sector, third 
country national workers could vote in works council elections but could not themselves be 
elected to these workers’ representation bodies. Furthermore, when reducing their 
workforce, employers were obliged to give priority to non-nationals in redundancies. Also, it 
is crucial to note that regardless of the length of residence, the right to reside in Austria was 
tied to the ability to generate a sufficient per capita income. Finally, foreign workers were 
entitled to around 30 weeks of unemployment benefit, after which they had to be self-
sufficient or risked losing residency rights. As Mark Bell notes (2002: 179), the Austrian policy 
legacy created a situation where foreign employees were highly dependent on their 
employer, vulnerable to exploitation and systematically allocated to the worst occupations 
without upward mobility to better jobs. The legal discrimination operating against migrant 
workers through national policy even overshadowed discriminatory practices at the informal 
level. In addition, most provisions aiming at the protection of this ground had limited 
effectiveness (Schindlauer 2004: 2). 
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Austrian Pressure Context 
The total pressure context merges the traditional material-organisational dimension captured 
by the misfit to the normative dimension of domestic adaptation. First, the level of legal misfit 
was high because there was no specific law dealing with anti-discrimination issues for the 
grounds covered by the ADDs, save for disability. For this ground, the misfit level was 
medium. The practical significance of the directives was high for the ground of disability, but 
less important for that of race/ethnicity in the case of Austria. In sum, the total level of policy 
misfit was medium for race but high for disability. In the politics and polity misfit, the ADDs 
prescribe administrative reforms for their enforcement and modified the traditional channels 
of domestic dialogue. This affects the grounds under study here because, not belonging to 
the core membership of social partners, both had to be considered in transposition. In 
addition, existing administrative routines had to be modified in order to extend legal standing 
to organisations working to promote equal treatment during transposition and enforcement. 
Finally, independent bodies had to be created and financed to investigate and pursue 
complaints in cases of discrimination, but only for race and ethnicity. These obligations 
implied an extension of competences of already existing gender equality bodies in Austria. 
Thus, the directives generated a medium level of misfit in the politics and polity dimension for 
both grounds. Finally, expected costs differed substantially for the two grounds of 
discrimination. For example, the extension of the concept of discrimination to the area of civil 
law for the ground of race/ethnicity, given the low practical significance of this ground, or the 
inclusion of NGOs in the fight against discrimination beyond transposition, were expected to 
have low costs in Austria. Other novelties introduced by the ADDs were to generate medium 
costs. For example, the increase in administrative costs to issue and provide written 
information on discrimination matters for public and private employers, the establishment of 
independent anti-discrimination bodies for the ground of race/ethnicity, and the costs linked 
to the necessary changes in behaviour so as to not discriminate in the future, could be more 
important – but still affordable for the Austrian state. Yet, in addition to this, the area of 
disability carried substantial costs. According to the EFD, working places had to be 
accommodated to the necessities of the various types of disabled people. These changes 
would be negatively biased towards Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, backbone of the 
Austrian industrial landscape but with fewer resources and lower awareness of changes in 
the law than larger firms, public institutions or social partners. Hence, total expected costs 
were medium for the ground of race/ethnicity and high for that of disability. All in all, the total 
misfit level was high for the ground of disability but medium for that of race and ethnicity.  
Second, the lack of legalisation of specific equal treatment norms in Austria did not reveal 
third-order incompatibilities. The Austrian Federal Constitution protects all citizens equally 
and requests equal treatment for all citizens, the European Convention of Human Rights and 
its protocols are part of the Constitution, and European Court of Human Rights judgements 
are legally binding. Moreover, Austria protected explicitly against gender discrimination in the 
workplace, protection that expanded after joining the EU. Thus, the overarching third-order 
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normative structure carried by the ADDs, as well as some second-order definitions and 
concepts, were already present. It is nonetheless noteworthy that these norms had only 
been recently adopted and that their source stemmed from foreign normative contexts. 
Nonetheless, several other norms included in the ADDs were not present domestically in 
Austria. The ground of race/ethnicity generated second-order normative clashes, while 
disability only first-order. Firstly, the extension of anti-discrimination principles to the area of 
civil law had been hitherto “hardly ever addressed” (Schindlauer 2004: 4), and came even 
before being extended to gender. Secondly, the directives also modified the domestic norm 
of social dialogue. As seen before, the ADDs required the extension of social dialogue to the 
NGO community. This was an important change for a country with a successful, deeply-
rooted trilateral model of concertation and social partnership. It was also the first time that 
their involvement in the enforcement process was domestically envisaged, thus producing a 
normative incompatibility at the second-order level, particularly for race/ethnicity since 
disability civil society organisations have a longer history and stronger presence than other 
NGOs in Austria. Thirdly, the directives prescribed the introduction of sanctions and 
compensations in cases of discrimination for any of the grounds covered, resembling more 
the Anglo-Dutch case law tradition than Austrian legal positivism. A certain sanction system 
existed already in Austria, but only for the ground of disability. Finally, and in addition, first-
order clashes also occurred, mainly for the ground of disability and with respect to the 
definition of the burden-of-proof, and the definition of indirect discrimination, which were 
modified compared to previous domestic conceptions. The philosophy behind these clashes 
had changed and now leaned closer to the victim of discrimination. All in all, the ground of 
disability generated second-order normative clashes, while that of disability mainly first-order 
clashes.  
When both quantitative and qualitative dimensions are combined, a more comprehensive 
picture of the domestic pressure context for each of the grounds emerges. This exercise 
evidences interesting additional insights that would have been neglected if the level of misfit, 
on the one hand, and the degree of normative incompatibility, on the other hand, had been 
studied separately, as will be seen later. The ground of race and ethnicity represented 
relatively inexpensive, yet normatively profound changes for domestic legislators. The 
ground of disability was relatively uncontroversial but with significant material-organisational 
implications. The expectations of having such pressure contexts still have to be compared to 
the formal transposition process and outcome.  
Transposition Process and Outcome 
Austria transposed the ground of race and ethnicity almost on time and essentially correctly 
by a government formed by the Christian Democrat agenda-setter Österreichische 
Volkspartei (ÖVP) and the extreme-right veto player Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ). 
The first draft proposals, including inter alia the area of race and ethnicity, were presented in 
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July 2003 – a few weeks before the deadline of the RD and six months before that of the 
EFD. After a broad consultation process, which did not modify the governmental proposals, 
the new laws were accepted by the government in November 2003. The NGO community, 
trade unions and opposition parties criticised the drafts for establishing a restrictive and 
incomprehensible anti-discrimination regime but could not oppose or modify the drafts 
(Interview AT1, AT6). Employers and economic circles supported minimal transposition. 
Through their close ties to the ÖVP, they could easily feed their position into the transposition 
process. In this context of domestic contestation, the ÖVP agreed to hold a Parliamentary 
expert hearing where discussants from the opposing parties and the NGO community could 
voice their opinion on the proposed law. This only led to minor revisions, such as the 
expansion of the equal treatment bodies to all EFD grounds, as well as minor semantic 
changes. The Bills were handed over to the National Council in May 2004, which passed 
them with the votes of the governing coalition. The Federal Council gave its consent on June 
2004, and the laws entered into force on the 1st of July 2004.10 This supposed a significant 
delay for the RD (almost a year after the official deadline).  
In terms of correctness, the most crucial requirements of the ADDs were transposed. Still, 
legal experts doubt whether all provisions were properly transposed. First, Austria only 
shifted partially the burden-of-proof. This went against the letter and spirit of the ADDs 
because victims of discrimination would bear some of the costs of being discriminated. 
Second, the bills established specialised bodies to enforce the law. The Equal Treatment 
Commissions and the Office for Equal Treatment were divided into three Senates. The 
second dealt, inter alia, with race and ethnicity in employment, while the third addressed the 
access to goods and services for that same ground. The broad mandate of these bodies 
contrasts with their lack of organisational and financial independence. The amount of 
physical and material resources at their disposal depends on the political lead of the party 
controlling the Ministry hosting them. In addition, members of the bodies would perform their 
functions on a voluntary, unpaid basis. Third, the ADDs mandated the inclusion in 
transposition and enforcement of civil society and social partners. During transposition, 
however, inclusion was restrictive. The NGO community and labour organisations were 
officially consulted during the process, even though they had initially been excluded from the 
process altogether. Although the criteria used to evaluate the “quality” of dialogue are always 
relative, it seems fair to say that the dialogue was not very intense in the case of transposing 
the race/ethnicity provisions. The Austrian government sent a few letters or e-mails of 
correspondence to NGOs, as well as organised a parliamentary hearing that left no room for 
dialogue among stakeholders. In contrast to this, the Austrian government organised a 
                                                     
10 Act adopting the Federal Equal Treatment Act (Gleichbehandlungsgesetz – GlBG und Änderung des 
Bundesgesetzes über die Gleichbehandlung von Frau und Mann im Arbeitsleben); Act on the Equal Treatment 
Commission and the Equal Treatment Office (Bundesgesetz über die Gleichbehandlungskommission und die 
Gleichbehandlungsanwaltschaft); both under BGBl. I Nr. 2004/66. In addition, Austria passed the Act amending the 
Equal Treatment Act (Änderung des Bundes-Gleichbehandlungsgesetzes); BGBl. I Nr. 2004/65. 
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conference gathering all interested NGOs and social partners to talk about how to transpose 
the EFD provisions on disability. In terms of inclusion in the enforcement process, a Plaintiff 
Association for the Enforcement of the Rights of Victims of Discrimination in the Courts was 
created, even though this body would depend on the precarious finances of its member 
NGOs.11 Fourth, the level of Austrian sanctions was far from being “effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive”. There were no criminal sanctions and the administrative penal proceedings 
initially totaled 360 Euro. Punishment for first-time-offenders was excluded and, depending 
on the courts’ will, the level of sanctions could be further reduced. Even though sanctions 
have been raised, the level is still not deterrent enough. Given these deficiencies, 
transposition was essentially, but not fully correct (e.g., Frey 2006; Interviews AT2, AT4).  
For the ground of disability, the same governmental coalition passed a “disability package” 
consisting of a new Disability Equality Act passed by the National and Federal Councils on 
July 200512 and a bundle of amendments to existing legislation passed between November 
and December 2005.13 The whole “package” entered into force on January 2006. Although 
Austria had not formally requested an extension of the official deadline for this ground, the 
European Commission did not act upon it given the inherent difficulties in legislating for this 
particular ground. Thus, Austria transposed this ground in a timely manner. The new 
Disability Act and other amended Acts over-implemented the requirements of the EFD, 
including the definition of the concept of “reasonable accommodation”, the creation of a 
separate Ombudsperson, and the establishment of compulsory conciliation and mediation 
procedures in cases of discrimination. Finally, during the transposition process, NGOs were 
also consulted several times, thus having a meaningful impact on the final outcome. 
Discussion 
The previous sections evidenced the usefulness of using the comprehensive pressure 
context approach developed in this paper. On the one hand, the traditional focus upon 
material-organisational elements would have proven incomplete to understand process and 
outcome of transposition in Austria and would have led to the rejection of the misfit 
hypothesis. On the other hand, a purely normative analysis of the transposition of the ADDs 
in Austria also would have left important unexplained gaps. The pressure context approach 
thus mattered in understanding the Austrian transposition process and outcome. 
                                                     
11 After transposition, a meeting on May 2006 between ministers and NGOs participating in the organisation was 
held to discuss anti-discrimination issues. Although the meeting was received positively by NGOs and financial 
support for the Association was promised, this institutionalisation of dialogue came late. 
12 Federal Disability Act (Bundes-Behindertengleichstellungsgesetz); BGBl. I Nr. 2005/82.  
13 The Act on the Employment of People with Disabilities (Behinderteneinstellungsgesetz), the Federal Disability Act 
(Bundesbehindertengesetz) and the Act on Federal Social Service (Bundessozialamtgesetz). 
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Examining the Austrian transposition of the disability provisions of the EFD, a purely 
material-organisational focus in the study of the process and outcome would have been 
misleading. Indeed, a purely quantitative focus would not have predicted over-
implementation and/or timely transposition of the disability provisions. However, adding the 
normative dimension to the picture of transposition provides a different analytical vision of 
the story. Indeed, the area of disability was normatively well-fleshed in Austria before the 
ADDs with a long history of intervention, laws, rules and policies at various levels, including 
the area of employment. This explains why domestic actors were less opposed to 
transposing the provisions on disability, actors could relate to the existing normative structure 
and look for solutions to transposition within the system. In other words, domestic actors 
were not lost in translating European requirements to the Austrian scene. Why disability was 
singled out for comprehensive over-implementation and a re-organisation and consolidation 
of the domestic normative order cannot be explained with the material-organisational 
dimension of the misfit hypothesis, and indeed would require the study of why domestic 
actors were willing and/or capable of doing so.  
The opposite emerges from the study of the transposition of the Race Directive. This proved 
to be the most controversial issue during the Austrian transposition process. In this case, 
expected material-organisational costs were medium and lower than those generated by the 
ground of disability. Yet, transposition was delayed and contained incorrect elements. This 
outcome, again, would have made the misfit hypothesis fail and cannot be understood 
without reference to the significant normative pressure at the second-order level. Domestic 
actors were unable to embrace EU requirements, having no domestic norm set to which they 
could relate. As expected, domestic actors shifted domestic debates from what kind of anti-
discrimination policy would be necessary in Austria to totally questioning the use of anti-
discrimination policy. This “issue relabeling” was also justified in the fact that the RD 
demanded changes beyond the “mentality” and the “way of doing things” in Austria (Interview 
AT1, AT3). This normative distance explains why Austrian actors were “hesitant” and “over-
cautious” in addressing a sensitive issue with implications that had not been well understood. 
A good example of this was the establishment of equal treatment bodies with broad 
functions, copied verbatim from the EFD, but with limited effectiveness. Similar remarks also 
characterise the transposition of sanctions to deter discrimination for this ground of 
discrimination.  
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Conclusions 
This paper drew upon existing explanatory frameworks developed by EU scholars in an 
attempt to clearly locate the misfit hypothesis in the variable spectrum of political scientists. 
Hitherto, scholarly efforts to achieve a common theoretical and empirical understanding of 
the misfit argument have been meager. Taking stock of the literature leads to inconclusive 
and confusing results and requires substantial re-conceptualisation work. This was precisely 
the main endeavour of this paper. First, from a theoretical point of view, the paper brought 
the argument back to its classical roots, without neglecting the advances made in the field in 
the last decade. This exercise allowed a careful delineation of the argument’s scope of action 
to situations where domestic actors are unable to transpose EU requirements, in contrast to 
situations where actors are unwilling or incapable. For these instances, the hypothesis may 
not be the most adequate explanatory variable, as many empirical works have shown.  
Second, the paper proposed a comprehensive re-operationalisation of the hypothesis. This 
novel operationalisation built upon the classical material-organisational dimension developed 
by Falkner et al. (2005), which looks at three levels of mismatch: the policy, polity and politics 
misfits. To this dimension, the normative incompatibility indicator developed by Dimitrova and 
Rhinard (2005) was appended. In doing so, the conceptualisation explicitly accounts for 
ideational elements in the form of norms. The combination of both dimensions gave rise to a 
measure of the domestic pressure context, a more powerful indicator of the domestic 
structure ex ante that provides better tools to predict process and outcomes of transposition.  
The usefulness of this approach was illustrated empirically. The analysis focused on the 
Austrian transposition experience of disability and race/ethnicity provisions included in two 
EU Anti-discrimination directives. The empirical part showed that transposition of these 
grounds could not have been predicted by focusing on the classical material-organisational 
dimension of misfit. Only when domestic norms are taken into account can the domestic 
logic of action be fully understood and predicted. High levels of normative incompatibility are 
telling of actors’ inability to translate EU requirements successfully, as was seen for the case 
of race and ethnicity. In that situation, material-organisational costs cannot soften the 
domestic pressure context and indeed, the higher these costs, the more likely will actors 
engage in “issue relabeling”. In such cases, delays and incorrectness are to be expected. By 
contrast, the lower the level of normative incompatibility, the greater will material-
organisational costs matter and, as shown in the literature, the more likely will transposition 
be driven by actors’ incapability and/or unwillingness. This situation was observed for the 
case of disability.  
All in all, the empirical reality confirmed that a broadly understood misfit still has a space in 
the family of independent variables that explain transposition, implementation and 
Europeanisation processes and outcomes. Moreover, it also confirmed that previous works 
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based on the misfit hypothesis may not be automatically wrong but require re-
conceptualisation and a deeper understanding of the causation logics behind the argument. 
More empirical work will be necessary to further refine the typology presented here. But 
cutting through the “misfit” jungle allowed finding a new path that fares well empirically, and 
so the misfit does not have to be a “very rarely true theory” or be abandoned altogether. On 
the contrary, if revised in the ways presented here it may still provide novel insights to 
scholars on how transposition, implementation and Europeanisation processes operate.  
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